A voice note, video call, or urgent executive message can be persuasive without being authentic. Payment control should rely on a known process that remains valid when the message itself cannot be trusted.
What the evidence supports
The FBI documents business email compromise schemes that impersonate executives and vendors. It has also described fraudsters using still images and deepfake audio in virtual meetings to direct wire transfers. The FBI recommends verifying requests through a separate communication channel.
Why it matters to a Connecticut operator
The risk is highest when urgency can bypass normal approval. A written payment-change process protects finance staff by making verification mandatory rather than discretionary.
Operator checklist
- Require two approvals for high-risk payments and all bank-detail changes.
- Verify requests using a known number or in-person channel independent of the message.
- Create a pause-and-escalate rule for secrecy, urgency, or pressure to bypass process.
- If fraud occurs, contact the financial institution immediately and report to the FBI’s IC3.
