Some ransomware crews abuse legitimate but vulnerable Windows drivers to reach the operating-system kernel and interfere with security software. The practical lesson is broader than any single ransomware family: trusted code can still create a high-impact path for attackers.
What the evidence supports
Microsoft documents that attackers exploit vulnerabilities in signed kernel drivers and recommends its vulnerable-driver blocklist, application control, and the attack-surface-reduction rule that blocks abuse of exploited signed drivers. Microsoft also warns that driver blocking should be tested because compatibility problems are possible.
Why it matters to a Connecticut operator
A disabled endpoint tool can delay detection while malware reaches POS workstations, shared files, identity systems, or backups. That is an operational-continuity problem—not proof of a licensing violation by itself.
Operator checklist
- Ask your MSP whether the Microsoft vulnerable-driver blocklist and relevant attack-surface-reduction rules are enforced.
- Test policy changes in audit mode before broad deployment.
- Limit local administrator rights and investigate attempts to disable security tooling.
- Keep protected backups and rehearse restoration of the systems that keep the operation open.